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Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS-
-PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION-PROCEDURE IN
STATE CRIMINAL TRIALS-JURY INSTRUCTIONS -The Supreme
Court of the United States has held that a state criminal trial
judge has a constitutional obligation, on a defendant's request, to
instruct a jury that no inference of guilt may be drawn from a
defendant's failure to testify.
Carter v. Kentucky, 101 S. Ct. 1112 (1981).
In December, 1978, Lonnie Joe Carter was arrested in Ken-
tucky and charged with burglarizing a local hardware store.'
Subsequently, a Kentucky grand jury indicted Carter for third-
degree burglary2 and for violation of Kentucky's persistent
felony offender statute.3 Before trial, on voir dire, the trial judge
briefly instructed the prospective jurors on the presumption of
innocence and the reasonable doubt standard.' In his opening
statement to the jury, defense counsel also stressed the
presumption of innocence.5
After the prosecution's case, the trial judge held a conference
out of the jury's presence to determine if Carter would testify.6
The judge explained to Carter that his prior felony convictions
could be used to impeach his credibility.7 After a private con-
ference with his attorney and before returning to open court,
1. Carter v. Kentucky, 101 S. Ct. 1112, 1114 (1981).
2. Id. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 511.040 (Baldwin 1975). In Kentucky,
burglary in the third degree is a class D felony punishable by imprisonment for
one to five years. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.060(2)(d) (Baldwin 1975).
3. 101 S. Ct. at 1114. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080 (Baldwin 1975).
The indictment alleged that the petitioner was convicted of two prior felonies.
Brief for Petitioner at 1 n.2.
4. 101 S. Ct. at 1114 n.3. Voir dire was conducted solely by the trial
judge. Id. at 1114.
5. Id. at 1115.
6. Id. With the judge present, defense counsel explained to Carter that
the fact of Carter's prior felony convictions could be used to impeach his
credibility, and that this would seriously impact on the jury. Id.
7. Id. The trial judge indicated that it was within his discretion to admit
evidence of the prior convictions. Id
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Carter told the judge that he had decided not to take the stand.'
Then, back in open court, the defense rested and asked that the
jury be instructed to draw no inference of guilt from the defen-
dant's failure to testify.' The trial judge refused the request.' In
his closing remarks, the prosecutor noted that the evidence
against the defendant had not been controverted nor had any
reasonable explanation been given for his conduct at the scene of
the burglary."
The jury returned a guilty verdict and recommended a two-
year sentence. Then, at the recidivist phase of the trial, the
jury sentenced the defendant to twenty years in prison, the max-
imum sentence under Kentucky's persistent felony offender
statute.'3
On appeal,"' the Kentucky Supreme Court rejected Carter's
argument that the fifth and fourteenth amendments require a
criminal trial judge to give the requested jury instruction and af-
firmed the conviction. 5 The court held that the requested in-
struction would have required the trial judge to directly com-
ment on the defendant's failure to testify, in violation of a Ken-
tucky statute which provides that a criminal defendant's failure
to testify on his own behalf shall not be commented upon or
create any presumption against him."
8. Id. During this private conference, defense counsel told the petitioner
that if he testified, the prosecutor would attempt to impeach his testimony, and
if he did not, the jury would probably use his failure to testify against him,
whether the prosecutor commented on it or not. Id. n.4.
9. Id at 1115-16. The requested instruction read: "The defendant is not
compelled to testify and the fact that he does not cannot be used as an in-
ference of guilt and should not prejudice him in any way." Id. at 1116.
10. Id.
11. Id. Defense counsel, in his closing argument, remarked that it was the
state's duty to prove the petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. He
stressed that the petitioner did not have to take the stand in his own behalf,
and that, in fact, he did not have to do anything. Id n.6.
12. Id. at 1116.
13. Id. During the recidivist phase, the jury considered evidence of
Carter's prior felony convictions. The defense presented no evidence. Id
14. There is a right of direct appeal to the Kentucky Supreme Court from
a judgment of a circuit court imposing a sentence of imprisonment of 20 or
more years. KY. R. CRIM. P. 12.02.
15. 101 S. Ct. at 1116.
16. Id. The Kentucky competency statute provides: "In any criminal or
penal prosecution the defendant, on his own request, shall be allowed to testify
Vol. 20:71
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The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari 7 and
reversed Carter's conviction. 8 The Court, by an 8-1 majority,
held that to ensure that no inference of guilt is drawn by a jury
from a defendant's failure to testify, a state trial court judge has
a constitutional obligation19 to provide a "no inference" instruc-
tion on a defendant's request.0
Justice Stewart, author of the majority opinion, 1 first noted
that the Court had specifically reserved the constitutional ques-
tion presented in Carter in two prior decisions, Griffin v. Califor-
nia' and Lakeside v. Oregon,23 both involving the fifth and four-
teenth amendments and jury instructions in state trial courts. 4
He pointed out, however, that as a matter of federal statutory
law, the question had been decided already in Bruno v. United
States,25 in which the federal competency statute26 was construed
to require a federal criminal trial judge to give an instruction
similar to that sought by Carter.'
in his own behalf, but his failure to do so shall not be commented upon or
create any presumption against him." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421.225 (Baldwin
1979). The court cited its decision in Green v. Commonwealth, 488 S.W.2d 339
(Ky. 1972), as controlling. See notes 98 & 99 and accompanying text infra.
17. 449 U.S. 819 (1980).
18. 101 S. Ct. at 1122.
19. The court referred to the defendant's fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination. Id. at 1121. The fifth amendment to the United States Con-
stitution provides in pertinent part: "No person . . .shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself ...." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
fifth amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment.
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). See note 28 infra.
The fourteenth amendment provides in pertinent part: "No State shall ...
deprive any person of . . .liberty . . .without due process of law ..... U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
20. 101 S. Ct. at 1121-22.
21. Justice Stewart's majority opinion was joined in by Chief Justice Burger
and by Justices White, Marshall, and Blackmun. Justice Powell filed a concurr-
ing opinion in which Justice Brennan joined. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissen-
ting opinion.
22. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). See notes 100-02 and accompanying text infra.
23. 435 U.S. 333 (1978). See notes 103-05 and accompanying text infra.
24. 101 S. Ct. at 1116.
25. 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3481 (1976). The statute provides in pertinent part: "In a
trial of all persons .. .[the defendant] shall, at his own request, be a competent
witness. His failure to make such a request shall not create any presumption
against him."
27. 101 S. Ct. at 1116 & n.7. In Bruno the Court construed the federal com-
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Justice Stewart observed that in Griffin the Court had held
that the fifth and fourteenth amendments prohibit prosecutorial
comment on a defendant's silence or a judicial instruction that a
defendant's silence may be evidence of guilt." The Griffin Court
reasoned that such adverse comment would be in effect a court-
imposed penalty on a defendant for exercising his self-
incrimination privilege.'
Justice Stewart then noted that the issue in Lakeside was
whether the giving of a "no inference" instruction over defense
objection violated the privilege against self-incrimination.30 He
observed that the Lakeside Court had concluded that Griffin pro-
hibited only adverse comment on a defendant's failure to testify,
and that a judge's instruction that the jury draw no adverse in-
ference was an entirely different kind of comment.3' The
Lakeside Court rejected the argument that when a trial judge in
any way draws attention to a defendant's silence, his privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination is violated.2
petency statute as giving a criminal defendant who did not take the stand an
absolute right to a requested "no inference" instruction. 308 U.S. at 292-93.
28. 101 S. Ct. at 1117. The Court decided Griffin shortly after it had held
in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), that the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination was applicable to the States through the fourteenth
amendment. Id.
In Malloy the defendant was ordered to testify before a referee appointed
by a state court to investigate gambling and other criminal activities. He re-
fused to testify on the ground that his answers might incriminate him. Id at 3.
The defendant's subsequent contempt conviction was affirmed by the Connecti-
cut Supreme Court of Errors, Malloy v. Hogan, 150 Conn. 220, 187 A.2d 744
(1963), rev'd, 318 U.S. 1 (1964), which held that the defendant's failure to explain
how his answer would incriminate him negated his claim to the protection of
the privilege against self-incrimination under state law. Id. at 227, 187 A.2d at
748. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the fourteenth
amendment prohibits state infringement of the privilege against self-
incrimination, and that the same standards apply in both state and federal
courts to determine whether a defendant's silence is justified. 378 U.S. at 10-11.
Malloy overruled Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908), and Adamson v.
California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947), which had held the fifth amendment inapplicable
to the states.
29. 101 S. Ct. at 1118 (citing 380 U.S. at 614).
30. 101 S. Ct. at 1118. See 435 U.S. 333 (1978).
31. 101 S. Ct. at 1118. The Lakeside Court reasoned that the instruction
there could not have provided the pressure on a defendant found impermissible
in Griffin, and that the purpose of a jury instruction is to direct the jurors' at-
tention to important legal concepts that must not be misunderstood. 435 U.S.
339-40.
32. 101 S. Ct. at 1118. The Lakeside Court rejected the argument because
Vol. 20:71
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Justice Stewart then examined the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, noting that it reflects many of our na-
tion's fundamental values which reveal a concern for the in-
dividual.' He stated that the principles enunciated in the Court's
prior cases construing the privilege lead unmistakably to the
conclusion that a judge must give a "no inference" jury instruc-
tion upon a defendant's request.' Justice Stewart also com-
mented that although the Bruno case was decided on statutory
grounds, fifth amendment considerations also influenced the
Court in that decision.'
The Court noted that Griffin stands for the proposition that a
defendant must pay no court-imposed price for exercising his
it was based on two faulty assumptions: "First, that the jurors have not noticed
that the defendant did not testify and will not, therefore, draw adverse in-
ferences on their own, second, that the jurors will totally disregard the instruc-
tion, and affirmatively give weight to what they have been told not to consider
at all." 435 U.S. at 340.
33. 101 S. Ct. at 1118-19. Justice Stewart stated that the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination:
reflects many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our
unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of
self-accusation, perjury or contempt; . . . our fear that self-incriminating
statements will be elicited by inhumane treatment and abuses; our sense
of fair play which dictates 'a fair state-individual balance by requiring the
government, in its contest with the individual, to shoulder the entire load'
... ;... ; our distrust of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization
that the privilege while sometimes 'a shelter to the guilty,' is often 'a pro-
tection to the innocent.'
Id. (quoting Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964)).
The Court also acknowledged reasons unrelated to guilt or innocence for
one's declining to testify: excessive timidity or nervousness when explaining
transactions or offenses charged, 101 S. Ct. 1119 n.15 (quoting Wilson v. United
States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893)); fear of being impeached by prior convictions or
other damaging information, 100 S. Ct. at 1119 n.15 (citing 380 U.S. at 615);
reluctance to incriminate persons loved or feared, 100 S. Ct. at 1119 n.15
(quoting 435 U.S. at 344 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
34. 101 S. Ct. at 1119.
35. I& In Bruno the Court recognized a defendant's privilege against self-
incrimination as more important than procedural rights and formalities and that
failure to instruct the jury on a defendant's silence was not merely a technical
error. I. (quoting 308 U.S. at 293-94). In addition, Justice Stewart noted that in
Griffin the Court had relied upon the rationale of Wilson v. United States, 149
U.S. 60 (1893), where the federal competency statute was construed as pro-
hibiting adverse comment on a defendant's silence. Justice Stewart concluded
that the Carter majority could similarly rely upon the federal statutory holding
in Bruno in reaching its decision. 101 S. Ct: at 1119 n.16.
1981
Duquesne Law Review
constitutional privilege not to testify." The Court stated that
although the penalty was exacted in Griffin by adverse comment
on the defendant's silence, the penalty may be just as severe
when there is no adverse comment, but the jury is given no in-
struction on the defendant's silence. 7 In such a case, the Court
concluded, jurors may well draw adverse inferences from a
defendant's silence. 8
Justice Stewart then noted that the significance of a cau-
tionary instruction was emphasized in Lakeside, where the Court
deemed the instruction so important as to permit it to be given
over the defendant's objection. The majority pointed out that
such instructions are necessary to properly guide the jury in its
understanding of basic constitutional principles, to dispel any
misconceptions, especially any regarding the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination." The Court concluded that a
trial judge has an affirmative constitutional obligation, when re-
quested, to reduce jury speculation about a defendant's silence to
a minimum by properly instructing the jury on the nature of the
fifth amendment privilege."
The Court then considered Kentucky's arguments for pro-
hibiting a "no inference" instruction. First, Kentucky contended
that the trial judge was actually protecting the defendant's in-
terests by refusing to grant his request.42 The Court rejected
this argument, stating that the Kentucky court's justification for
refusing the defendant's request, which was that the instruction
would have emphasized the defendant's failure to testify, had
been specifically rejected in Lakeside.3
The Court also rejected Kentucky's argument that the trial
judge's instruction that the jury determine guilt from the
36. 101 S. Ct. at 1119.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 1119-20.
40. Id. at 1120.
41. Id
42. Id. at 1120-21. This argument was based on the Kentucky Supreme
Court's holding in Green v. Commonwealth, 488 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1972). See
notes 98-99 infra.
43. 101 S. Ct. at 1121. The Lakeside Court had found that by cautioning
the jury not to draw inferences of guilt from the defendant's silence a trial
judge could not possibly be penalizing the defendant for exercising his
privilege. Id.
Vol. 20:71
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evidence alone was sufficient to dispel any adverse inferences
from the jurors' minds." The majority maintained that the in-
struction on presumption of innocence was not a substitute for
the requested instruction, noting instead that the jury, not know-
ing the technical meaning of "evidence," could have derived
significant additional guidance from a specific instruction on the
self-incrimination privilege.45
Finally, because the issue had not been considered by the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court, the Court refused to consider Kentucky's
argument that the trial court's failure to grant the requested in-
struction constituted "harmless error."46
Justice Powell filed a concurring opinion,47 accepting the ma-
jority's holding, but noting that it was required by precedent,
not the Constitution.48 He first examined the Griffin Court's
holding that jurors could not be told that they could draw in-
ferences from a defendant's failure to testify and observed that
it departed from the purpose and language of the self-
incrimination clause.49 Justice Powell agreed with the Griffin
dissenters, 5 that any inquiry into the fifth amendment privilege
44. Id Justice Stewart re-emphasized that "[jurors are not lawyers; they
do not know the technical meaning of "evidence." They can be expected to
notice a defendant's failure to testify, and, without limiting instruction, to
speculate about incriminating inferences from a defendant's silence." Id.
45. Id. The Court conceded, however, that the fifth amendment privilege
and the presumption of innocence are related principles. The majority added
that the arguments of defense counsel at trial are not a substitute for the re-
quested instruction. Id See United States v. Bain, 596 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1979)
(defendant who chose not to testify is entitled to an additional instruction
besides burden of proof instruction); United States v. English, 409 F.2d 200 (3d
Cir. 1969) (presumption of innocence instruction not sufficient where defendant
requested instruction on failure to testify).
46. Id In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967), the Court indicated
that there may be some constitutional errors in a conviction which, under the
circumstances of a particular case, are so unimportant that they may be deemed
harmless and will not require an automatic reversal of the conviction. Although
the Court refused to rule on the issue in Carter, 101 S. Ct. at 1121, Justice
Stewart cautioned that, arguably, refusal to give an instruction similar to the
one requested by Carter could never be harmless. Id
47. 101 S. Ct. at 1122 (Powell, J., concurring).
48. Id
49. Id
50. Id. Justice Powell took particular note of Justice Stewart's Griffin dis-
sent, which was joined in by Justice White. Id. See 380 U.S. at 617 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting). In this dissent, Justice Stewart declared that the fifth amendment
1981
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must focus on the presence of compulsion,"' and judged that a
defendant who chooses not to testify cannot claim that he was
compelled to do so.2 He maintained that nothing in the self-
incrimination clause requires that jurors not draw logical in-
ferences when a defendant chooses not to explain incriminating
circumstances.- Justice Powell concluded, however, that because
Griffin was now the law, the petitioner was entitled to the jury
instruction he requested. 4
Justice Stevens, in a separate opinion,' emphasized that the
majority's holding is limited to cases in which the defendant has
requested the "no inference" instruction. 6 He argued that the
question of whether the instruction should be given is one that
should be answered by the defendant and his lawyer, not by the
state. 7
In a dissenting opinion,58 Justice Rehnquist first commented
that only the first of the series of steps taken by the Court in
reaching its decision can be traced directly to the United States
Constitution; but because the majority reversed the judgment of
the Supreme Court of Kentucky, it must have found the state
court decision to be inconsistent with the United States Constitu-
inquiry is whether the defendant has been compelled to testify against himself.
He maintained that the compulsion found by the Griffin majority was
dramatically different from and not as palpable as that which gave rise to the
fifth amendment guarantee, and that the Griffin majority stretched the concept
beyond reasonable grounds. Justice Stewart also believed that whatever com-
pulsion existed in Griffin emanated not from courts or counsel, but from the
defendant's own choice not to testify. 101 S. Ct. 1122 (Powell, J., concurring)
(quoting 380 U.S. at 620-21 (Stewart, J., dissenting)).
51. 101 S. Ct. at 1122 (Powell, J., concurring). See note 50 supra.
52. 101 S. Ct. at 1122 (Powell, J., concurring).
53. Id. Justice Powell concluded that the comment complained of in Griffin
should not have been prohibited, because it would not have been evidence on
which the jury could have based its verdict, and it would have outlined for the
jury the extent of its freedom to draw inferences. Id. (citing Traynor, The
Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention, and Trial, 33 U. CHI. L.
REV. 657, 677 (1966)).
54. 101 S. Ct. at 1122-23 (Powell, J., concurring).
55. 101 S. Ct. at 1123 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Brennan joined in this
opinion.
56. Id.
57. Id. Justice Stevens made a similar argument in Lakeside. 435 U.S. at
343-44 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See notes 114 & 115 and accompanying text in-
fra.
58. 101 S. Ct. at 1123 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Vol. 20:71
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tion.59 He then pointed out that the constitutional issue in this
case is one that the Court had specifically anticipated and re-
served in Griffin and Lakeside; he disagreed with the majority's
reliance on Bruno to now decide the issue, arguing that because
the language of the federal statute construed in Bruno does not
attempt to govern the procedures or instructions of Kentucky
trial courts, the case has no relevance to Carter."
Justice Rehnquist next asserted that until the self-incrimina-
tion clause was held applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment, 1 the fifth amendment would not have
regulated the conduct of Kentucky criminal trials.2 He noted
that Justice Stewart, dissenting in Griffin,' had expressed the
notion that the formulation of procedural rules to govern the ad-
ministration of justice in the various states is a matter of local
concern." He stated that even Griffin, however, by reserving the
issue of whether a state court defendant was entitled as a matter
of right to a "no inference" instruction, did not go as far as the
present opinion, which is a complete retreat from Justice
Stewart's Griffin dissent."
Finally, Justice Rehnquist maintained that the majority's con-
cept of "burdens" and "penalties," taken from the Griffin holding
that a defendant must pay no court-imposed price for the exer-
cise of his fifth amendment privilege, is so vague that the deci-
sion allows a state criminal defendant to virtually take the con-
trol over jury instructions away from the trial judge."
The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination,
which protects a defendant from being compelled to give self-
59. Id.
60. Id
61. Id See note 28 supra.
62. 101 S. Ct. at 1123 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). But, Justice Rehnquist
maintained, even if it did, the claim by the defendant is not that he was forced
to testify against his will inconsistently with the provisions of the fifth amend-
ment, but rather that in Griffin a jury charge permitting the consideration of
any evidence or facts which a defendant could have reasonably been expected
to deny or explain violates the privilege against self-incrimination. Id at
1123-24 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
63. 380 U.S. at 617 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
64. 101 S. Ct. at 1122 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting 380 U.S. at 623
(Stewart, J., dissenting)).
65. 101 S. Ct. at 1122 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66. Id
1981
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incriminating testimony, initially emerged as a reaction to the
use of the oath ex officio by the ecclesiastical courts of thirteenth
century England. 7 By the end of the seventeenth century, the
oath was abolished,68 and the privilege became firmly established
in English law. 9 At approximately the same time, the privilege
began to be assimilated into the laws of the American colonies
70
and eventually became part of the fifth amendment."
Historically, the privilege applied only to pre-trial procedure,
because at common law, a defendant was not permitted to testify
at trial.7 ' Not until 1864 did this practice begin to change in the
67. The oath ex officio was a sworn statement by the defendant to give
true answers to whatever questions might be asked of him, without first being
formally charged with an offense. After the oath was administered, the accused
was required to answer a series of interrogatories intended to extract a confes-
sion. L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT, THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-
INCRIMINATION 46-47 (1968) [hereinafter cited as LEVY]. Frequently, torture and
imprisonment were used to compel accused persons to take the oath. These
abuses were most notorious during the reign of Elizabeth I, when the English
Court of High Commission made use of the oath procedure in its drive to
repress Puritanism and other non-Anglican religious beliefs. Id. at 83-135.
68. The oath was abolished following the trial of John Lilburn. Trial of
John Lilburn, 3 Howell's State Trials 1315 (1637). Lilburn had refused to take
the oath ex officio and was subsequently "whipped and pilloried." Id. at 1327-28.
For a full description of the trial, see 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2250, at 282-83
(McNaughton rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE]; LEVY, supra note 67, at
266-300.
69. WIGMORE, supra note 68, § 2250, at 283-84. In 1641, the English Parlia-
ment, by statute, forbade the use of the ex officio oath by any ecclesiastical
court in any penal cause. Id. The reaction against the use of the oath in the ec-
clesiastical courts also affected English common law courts, so that by the end
of the seventeenth century, the privilege against self-incrimination was firmly
established. Id. at 290-91.
70. The privilege emerged in the colonies as a result of the eventual adop-
tion of many of the principles of the English common law by the colonial
governments. Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional History of the Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination in America, 21 VA. L. REV. 763, 766-67 (1935). It was
established in the New England colonies in 1641, id. at 776, and in Virginia by
about 1661. Id. at 780. The privilege appeared in other American colonies prior
to the Revolution. Id. at 781-82.
71. By 1789, the privilege had been inserted into the constitutions or Bills
of Rights of seven American states: Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, North
Carolina, Vermont, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. Id. at 764-65.
72. Dills, The Permissibility of Comment on the Defendant's Failure to
Testify in His Own Behalf in Criminal Proceedings, 3 WASH. L. REV. 161, 164
(1928) [hereinafter cited as Dills]. The defendant was disqualified from testifying
because of interest, but his confession could still be received. Id.
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United States with the nationwide enactment of statutes making
defendants competent to testify.
In response to the problem of what inferences a jury could
draw when the defendant failed to testify, the competency
statutes generally provided that the defendant's failure to testify
should not be commented upon or create any presumptions
against him.74 From this tradition grew the line of precedent
relied upon by the Court in Carter.
As a matter of federal statutory law, the question presented in
Carter was decided in Bruno v. United States," which held that
the federal competency statute"6 required the trial judge to give,
at the defendant's request, an instruction that no inference be
drawn from the defendant's failure to testify.77
In the state courts, the issue has been addressed with varying
results. Most state courts that have ruled on the question have
held that the trial judge should give the requested instruction."
In some states where the issue has not been specifically ad-
dressed, there is implied support for the holding in Carter."9 Only
73. Id at 164-65.
74. Id at 165. In fact, it was feared that granting a defendant the capacity
to testify was in itself a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. 70
DicK.. L. REV. 98, 100-01 (1965).
75. 308 U.S. 287 (1939).
76. See note 26 supra.
77. 308 U.S. at 293.
78. See, e.g., Perry v. State, 368 So. 2d 310, 312 (Ala. 1979) (trial court's
refusal to give requested "no inference" jury instruction constitutes reversible
error); State v. Piper, 113 Ariz. 390, 555 P.2d 636 (1976) (at defendant's request,
trial court required to give "no inference" instruction); Clay v. State, 236 Ga.
398, 224 S.E.2d 14 (1976) (if timely request made by defendant, error for trial
judge to fail to give "no inference" charge); State v. Spearman, 84 N.M. 366, 503
P.2d 649 (1972) (giving of requested "no inference" instruction not discretionary,
but required by statute); People v. Britt, 43 N.Y.2d 111, 371 N.E.2d 504, 400
N.Y.S.2d 785 (1977) (statute requires "no inference" charge at defendant's re-
quest); State v. Hale, 22 Or. App. 144, 537 P.2d 1173 (1975) ("no inference" in-
struction should always be given when requested); Hines v. Commonwealth, 217
Va. 905, 234 S.E.2d 262 (1977) (instruction should always be given at defendant's
request); State v. McClure, 253 S.E.2d 555 (W.Va. 1979) (importance of giving
"no inference" instruction re-affirmed). See also Brief for Petitioner at A1-A3.
79. See State v. Botts, 184 Neb. 78, 165 N.W.2d 358 (1969) ("no inference"
instruction given sua sponte); State v. Marmon, 154 N.W.2d 55 (N.D. 1967) (giv-
ing of "no inference" instruction was proper even absent specific request from
defendant); State v. Fowler, 110 N.H. 110, 261 A.2d 429 (1970) (trial court should
accede to defendant's wishes in regard to a "no inference" instruction); Rowan
v. State, 212 Tenn. 224, 369 S.W.2d 543 (1963) (general charge on presumption
1981
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five states, including Kentucky, have specifically held that the
trial judge is not required to give the requested "no inference"
instruction."
Kentucky case law reflects some uncertainty on the part of the
Kentucky Supreme Court s" about the state's policy toward "no
inference" instructions. In a 1903 case, Tines v. Commonwealth,8"
the defendant did not take the stand, and the jury was in-
structed that no inference of guilt should be drawn from his
failure to testify.8 After being convicted of burglary," the defen-
dant appealed to the Kentucky Supreme Court which held that
the trial judge had erred in giving the instruction. 5 The court
reasoned that under the Kentucky competency statute 6 the
defendant was entitled to absolute silence on his failure to
testify." Following the Tines rationale, subsequent Kentucky
cases held that a trial judge's refusal to instruct the jury on a
defendant's silence was not prejudicial error.88
of innocence sufficient absent special request for more explicit instruction on
failure to testify); Jaffrion v. State, 501 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)
(failure to give instruction sua sponte not reversible error), See also Brief for
Petitioner at A4 & A5.
80. The other four states include Minnesota, Nevada, Oklahoma, and
Wyoming. 101 S. Ct. at 1114 n.2. See State v. Grey, 256 N.W.2d 74 (Minn. 1977)
(trial judge should not mention defendant's failure to take stand); Jackson v.
State, 84 Nev. 203, 438 P.2d 795 (1968) (failure to give "no inference" instruction
not error); Brannin v. State, 375 P.2d 276 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962) (giving of "no
inference" instruction violates state statute); Kinney v. State, 36 Wyo. 466, 256
P. 1040 (1927) (refusal to give requested "no inference" instruction not
error).
81. Previously Court of Appeals.
82. 25 Ky. L. Rep. 1233, 77 S.W. 363 (1903).
83. Id at 1234, 77 S.W. at 364.
84. Id
85. Id
86. See note 16 supra.
87. 25 Ky. L. Rep. at 1234, 77 S.W. at 364.
88. See Roberson v. Commonwealth, 274 Ky. 49, 118 S.W.2d 157 (1938)
(trial judge's refusal to instruct jury not to consider fact of defendant's silence
upheld); Hanks v. Commonwealth, 248 Ky. 203, 58 S.W.2d 394 (1933) (trial
judge's refusal to instruct jury that defendant's failure to testify raised no
presumption of guilt upheld). But see Armstrong v. Commonwealth, 190 Ky.
217, 227 S.W. 162 (1921). In Armstrong the Kentucky Supreme Court held that
while it is the safer practice for the trial court not to give the instruction, it
may not necessarily constitute reversible error in every case. The court
distinguished Tines, noting that in Tines error was also found in the improper
admission into evidence of an affidavit which was the sole link between the
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Then, in 1945, in Kelley v. Commonwealth,89 the Kentucky
Supreme Court stated that it would have been better for the
trial judge in that case to have given the requested instruction,
but because no reference to the defendant's silence was made by
the court, failure to give the instruction did not constitute pre-
judicial error." In 1963,91 the court held that where the defendant
does not take the stand, the giving of the instruction would con-
stitute prejudicial error,92 distinguishing Kelley as indicating
that a "no inference" instruction may be required when re-
quested by the defendant.9" In 1971, 9" the court bolstered Kelly,
holding specifically that the Kentucky competency statute re-
quires that the instruction be given when requested."
Despite this evolution toward requiring the giving of a re-
quested "no inference" instruction, the Kentucky Supreme Court
did an about-face one year later. In Scott v. Commonwealth" the
court held that under Kentucky case law a defendant is not en-
titled to a "no inference" instruction, even if requested.97 Also
that year, in Green v. Commonwealth," the court held that the
Kentucky competency statute prohibits any comment, whether
by the trial judge or prosecutor.99
As noted by the Carter Court, the constitutional issues raised
by the giving of jury instructions in connection with a
defendant and the crime. 190 Ky. at 222, 227 S.W. at 164. The court expressed
doubt whether reversal would have occurred in Tines if the giving of the "no in-
ference" instruction had been the only error committed. Id.
89. 300 Ky. 136, 187 S.W.2d 796 (1945).
90. Id at 143, 187 S.W.2d at 797.
91. Hopper v. Commonwealth, 371 S.W.2d 646 (Ky. 1963).
92. 371 S.W.2d at 648.
93. Id.
94. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 467 S.W.2d 128 (Ky. 1971).
95. Id. at 131. See note 16 supra.
96. 495 S.W.2d 800 (Ky. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1073 (1973).
97. Id. at 802. The court rejected its earlier statement in Spencer as only
dictum. Id. See notes 94 & 95 accompanying text supra.
98. 488 S.W.2d 339 (Ky. 1972).
99. Id. at 341. The Green court refused to accept the defendant's request
that the Kentucky statute be interpreted as the United States Supreme Court
had interpreted the federal competency statute in Bruno. See notes 25-27 and
accompanying text supra. The court reasoned that, unlike the federal statute,
the Kentucky competency statute specifically states that "[a defendant's] failure
to [testify] shall not be commented upon." Id See note 16 supra. The court con-
cluded that these words require that a defendant is not entitled to a "no in-
ference" instruction. 488 S.W.2d at 341-42.
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defendant's self-incrimination privilege were first considered by
the United States Supreme Court in Griffin,1"' where the Court
determined whether compulsion was present by examining the
extent to which the defendant was penalized for exercising his
fifth amendment privilege.1"' Applying this "penalty" test, the
Court concluded that unconstitutional compulsion was present in
a jury instruction that suggests to jurors that they may draw
adverse inferences from a defendant's silence. 10
The issues were further developed in Lakeside,"3 where the
Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination is not
violated when a trial judge gives a "no inference" instruction,
even though the defendant objects. 4 Justice Stewart, writing
the majority opinion, reasoned that a cautionary "no inference"
instruction could not provide the kind of unconstitutional compul-
sion to testify found in Griffin."5
Although Carter appears to follow this line of precedent, ex-
tending a liberal interpretation of the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, such a conclusion may not be accurate.
The Griffin Court used a "penalty" test to determine whether
compulsion was present: any action by the court or prosecution
which made it costly for the defendant to exercise his privilege
was held to violate the fifth amendment.' Justice Stewart
dissented,'017 stating that the concept of compulsion was being too
liberally extended, and advocating a more conservative approach
to fifth amendment interpretation. He argued that in evaluating
the validity of jury instructions, more weight should be given to
the state's interest in ascertaining truth at trial through the use
100. 380 U.S. 609 (1965). See notes 28 & 29 and accompanying text supra.
101. 380 U.S. at 614. See note 29 and accompanying text supra.
102. 380 U.S. at 615. Griffin is an indication that the Supreme Court favors
a liberal application of the fifth amendment. See Note, Prosecutorial Comment
and Judicial Instruction on a Defendant's Failure to Testify: In Support of a
Liberal Application of the Fifth Amendment, 13 VAL. L. REV. 261, 287 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as Failure to Testify].
103. 435 U.S. 333 (1978). See notes 30-32 and accompanying text supra.
104. 435 U.S. at 340-41.
105. Id. at 339. The very purpose of a cautionary instruction, the Lakeside
Court concluded, is to clarify in jurors' minds certain concepts that must not be
misunderstood. Id. at 340.
106. See notes 28 & 29 and accompanying text supra.
107. 380 U.S. at 617 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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of carefully controlled jury instructions: 1°8
The competing interests of the defendant and the state were
again at issue in Lakeside,"9 and with Justice Stewart now
writing for the majority, the Court allowed a "no inference" in-
struction to be given over the defendant's objection."' The basis
of the decision Was the importance of providing the jury with ap-
propriate cautionary instructions."' Thus, the principle for which
Justice Stewart had argued in his Griffin dissent, ascertaining
truth at trial through the use of carefully formulated jury in-
structions, actually prevailed in Lakeside."' Also prevailing was
Justice Stewart's view that the concept of compulsion was being
too liberally extended, for the compulsion necessary to satisfy
the Griffin test arguably was present in Lakeside. As Justice
Stevens explained in his Lakeside dissent,13 in some cases,
where the whole story is told at trial by other witnesses or
where the prosecution's case is very weak, the jury may not
focus on the defendant's failure to testify."" In such a case,
Justice Stevens maintained, a "no inference" instruction may
have an adverse effect; for even if the jurors try faithfully to
follow the instruction, the connection between silence and guilt,
of which they have just been made aware, may be too strong to
resist. He concluded that an application of Griffin would require
that the instruction not have been given."'
Carter appears to follow Griffin in that the "penalty" test was
applied to ascertain whether compulsion was present;"' but
because Justice Stewart wrote the Carter opinion, ascertaining
the degree of compulsion may not be the actual basis for the
Court's decision. In Carter, Justice Stewart emphasized the im-
portance and necessity of carefully instructing the jury on basic
legal concepts,"7 as he did in the Lakeside decision." 8
108. Id at 622 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
109. See notes 103-05 and accompanying text supra.
110. 435 U.S. at 340-41. See note 104 & 105 supra.
111. 435 U.S. at 340.
112. See 62 MARQ. L. REV. 74, 83 (1978).
113. 435 U.S. at 342 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114. Id at 345 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
115. Id at 345-47 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
116. 101 S. Ct. at 1119. See text accompanying notes 37 & 38 supra.
117. 101 S. Ct. at 1120. See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
118. 435 U.S. at 340. This view of the Carter majority seems to be shared
by Justice Stevens who felt it necessary to emphasize in his concurrence that
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After Carter, it is not clear what type of analysis the Supreme
Court will use in regard to these cases: ascertaining the degree
of compulsion present, or forwarding the state's interest in truth
at trial through cautionary instructions."9 One conclusion, based
on Lakeside, is that the Court prefers that more weight general-
ly be given to the importance of giving cautionary instructions,
whether requested by the defendant or not, and is simply paying
lip-service in its opinions to the compulsion concept. 12 1 If this is
the case, the real problems for a defendant who fails to take the
stand will not arise in cases such as Carter, where both the
defendant and the Court agreed that a cautionary instruction
should be given. It is in the Lakeside situation, where the Court's
preference and the defendant's interest clash and perhaps
endanger one of the protections that shield the individual from
his much stronger adversary, the State.12'
Terry J. Trexler
the decision of whether a "no inference" instruction is to be given should be
answered by the defendant and his lawyer, and not by the state. 101 S. Ct. at
1123 (Stevens, J., concurring). See also note 115 and accompanying text supra.
119. See generally Ritchie, Compulsion that Violates the Fifth Amendment:
The Burger Court's Definition, 61 MINN. L. REV. 383, 406 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as The Burger Court's Definition].
120. See Failure to Testify, supra note 102, at 294; 62 MARQ. L. REV. 74, 88
(1978).
121. See The Burger Court's Definition, supra note 120, at 431.
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